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Abstract
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-
ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing
function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her indi-
vidual profit given other competing suppliers’ bids. Based on the submit-
ted bids, the market operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during
each hour and determines hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this
game-theoretic process reaches a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is
motivated to modify her bid. However, solving the individual profit max-
imization problem requires information of rivals’ bids, which are typically
not available. To address this issue, we develop an inverse optimization
approach for estimating rivals’ production cost functions given historical
market clearing prices and production levels. We then use these func-
tions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium bids. We present
numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing good agree-
ment between bids based on the estimated production cost functions with
the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our
approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in location-
dependent prices.
Keywords: Day-ahead market, Equilibrium bids, Learning, Inverse equi-
librium, Inverse optimization.
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1 Introduction
In the past several decades that followed the seminal work on spot market pric-
ing [1], the electricity industry has evolved from vertical integrated regulated
monopolies to competitive supply and demand market participants with equal
access to a regulated transmission and distribution network. Nevertheless, due
to special features of the power industry, including a limited number of producers
(electricity suppliers), large capital investments that introduce barriers to en-
try, and congestion caused by occasionally binding transmission constraints, the
electricity market is characterized by oligopolistic conditions [2]. Under perfect
competition, suppliers would bid their marginal costs, a necessary condition for
social welfare and efficiency maximization. In an imperfect oligopolistic energy
market setting, however, suppliers can exploit market manipulation opportuni-
ties to increase their profits by bidding above their marginal cost.
The investigation of such behavior, referred to as strategic bidding, is of dual
interest. First, to market participants (mainly suppliers), who are interested in
devising optimal bidding strategies that would allow them to “outsmart” com-
petitors and realize profits exceeding those that a perfectly competitive market
would allow. Second, to market regulators, who are interested in identifying
market power abuses and developing policies to increase efficiency and social
welfare.
There is an immense amount of literature on strategic bidding in the con-
text of electricity markets (see e.g., [3] for a related non-exhaustive literature
review) particularly when one takes into account the specific market rules that
apply. Currently, U.S. markets involve multi-part bids for energy and commit-
ment costs, as well as several types of ancillary services, resulting in location-
dependent hourly and real-time (5 min) prices. In the European day-ahead
market coupling problem [4], even more complex bids are allowed. Regardless
of the underlying framework and market rules, an optimal bidding strategy aims
to answer the same question: how to bid in order to maximize profits.
From a game-theoretic point of view, the approaches for equilibrium analy-
sis of the strategic bidding problem can be further classified as Bertrand mod-
els, Cournot and Stackelberg models, and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE)
models. In the latter approach, instead of setting their price bids (Bertrand)
or quantities (Cournot), suppliers bid their supply functions that link prices
with quantities. The SFE literature originates from the seminal work of Klem-
perer and Meyer [5], and, since its first application in electricity markets [6],
it has been extensively studied — an overview is presented in [7], in both styl-
ized examples and actual electricity markets (see, e.g., [8–10] for analytical and
numerical results, and [11] for an empirical analysis).
One of the main criticisms regarding game-theoretic approaches is the un-
realistic assumption that the payoff functions of all participants are publicly
available. Most related works deal with this issue by assuming some type of
uncertainty. An early work [12] proposes a recursive dynamic programming ap-
proach for determining the optimal bid price for each block of generation, in
which each supplier models the uncertainty about rival bid prices by a proba-
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bility distribution. In [13], the developed bidding scheme maximizes the hourly
profit assuming all other producers’ bids are represented by a multivariate nor-
mal distribution whose parameters are estimated from historical data. In [14],
each supplier assumes types (based on the cost structure) of other suppliers and
their joint probability distribution, based on the published information on fuel
contracts, availability of transmission lines, and operating parameters. In [15],
a decomposition-based particle swarm optimization method is proposed to solve
the expected profit maximization problem with the market clearing price mod-
eled as an uncertain, exogenous variable. In [16], a decentralized Nash equi-
librium learning strategy is presented in a Bertrand competition framework to
solve the economic dispatch problem. Recently, in [17], a Bayesian inference ap-
proach is proposed to reveal the aggregate supply curve in a day-ahead electricity
market. In [18], a non-cooperative game with incomplete information among
demand response aggregators is considered under different market conditions,
where a Bayesian approach is used to estimate the unknown information such
as the types of competitors. In [19], a multi-period market equilibrium problem
is considered to study the strategic behavior of energy storage systems, where
the optimality conditions of all participants’ profit maximization problems are
collected and solved together.
In this paper, we consider SFE-based equilibrium strategies for suppliers in
the context of a day-ahead electricity market. We address the aforementioned
criticism by estimating payoff functions using an inverse optimization approach
combined with the theory of variational inequalities [20]. Inverse optimization
seeks to recover input data to optimization problems from optimal solutions;
it was first introduced in [21] but recently revisited in new settings [20, 22,
23]. Interestingly, inverse optimization has not been extensively used in the
context of electricity markets. In [24], inverse optimization is used to identify
the bids of marginal suppliers in a multi-period network-constrained electricity
pool. In [25], it is employed to address the market-bidding problem of a cluster
of price-responsive consumers of electricity. In [26], it is used to determine
market structure from commodity and transportation prices; the methodology
is applied to data from the MISO electricity market. Recently, [27] used inverse
optimization to estimate how loads respond to demand response price signals.
A preliminary conference version of this paper has appeared in [28]. That
paper focused on comparisons between inverse optimization-based strategic bid-
ding versus earlier approaches [13]. The present paper uses a different, more
realistic parametrization of the unknown cost function with respect to observ-
able market variables, has an extensive numerical validation of the proposed
approach, establishes new rigorous results on algorithm termination, and offers
extensions to location-dependent prices.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to leverage inverse optimization
for estimating cost parameters in payoff functions and obtaining equilibrium
bids in the context of electricity markets. Our method is driven purely by
data, in the sense that only the observed samples are utilized for inference and
estimation, without relying on any distributional assumptions on the observed
data. We note that any hypothesis on the data generating pattern could be
3
questionable, due to the lack of supporting evidence on such assumption and
the noisy nature of the data. By contrast, data-driven approaches receive input
from the observed samples and are self-adjusted in the estimation process as
more samples are available.
The main idea of this paper is to learn from past bids of electricity suppliers
that bid strategically in a day-ahead market context. We develop an inverse op-
timization approach for estimating suppliers’ cost functions, based on historical
bidding data. We propose an algorithm that randomly searches for cost function
parameters with good out-of-sample performance, among multiple possible val-
ues that are compatible with past data. Our proposed framework is validated
with extensive numerical experimentation, and is extended to accommodate
location-dependent prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
the general market framework. In Section 3, we formulate the strategic bidding
problem (referred to as the “forward” problem), and in Section 4 we present the
inverse optimization framework as it applies to our day-ahead market setting.
In Section 5, we discuss the specific algorithm we use to estimate competitors’
cost parameters, based on which equilibrium bids are obtained, and establish its
convergence properties. In Section 6 we illustrate our approach with numerical
examples. In Section 7, we discuss the extension of our approach to location-
dependent prices. We conclude and provide directions for further research in
Section 8.
2 Market Framework
We consider a day-ahead electricity market setting, which is composed of N
electricity suppliers, and a market operator instantiating a Power Exchange
(PX). Each supplier submits a bid curve (supply curve) that describes the rela-
tionship between energy price and production quantity, for each of the 24 hours
of the next day. After receiving the bidding functions from all suppliers, the
market operator clears the market by balancing aggregate supply and demand;
the output is the hourly market clearing price and the supplier specific dispatch
schedules. Assuming no inter-temporal coupling in the PX setting, the auctions
for different hours are performed separately and independently. This allows us
to consider the bidding strategy for a specific hour and omit the time index in
our analysis.
In actual power markets, the bidding functions are piecewise-constant curves,
reflecting the constant bid price (marginal as-bid cost) for each block of elec-
tricity generation. These piecewise-constant curves correspond to piecewise-
linear functions for the total as-bid costs of the suppliers, which approximate a
quadratic cost function of typical generators. Piecewise-linear functions are used
in practice to allow reliance on available commercial optimization solvers (for
solving large-scale security-constrained unit commitment and economic dispatch
problems typically formulated as mixed integer linear programming problems).
In this paper, we assume the same affine bid curve as commonly used in the SFE
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literature; this assumption not only facilitates our analysis, but also corresponds
to a quadratic approximation of generator cost functions.
Assume that supplier i submits a linear non-decreasing bid function to the
market operator, αi + βiPi, i = 1, . . . , N, that denotes the marginal as-bid
cost of power at production level Pi, and αi, βi are the bidding coefficients
to be determined under the optimal bidding strategy. After receiving these
linear bidding functions, the market operator derives the clearing price and the
generator dispatch schedule as follows:
R = αi + βiPi, i ∈ I, (1)
Q = Qforecast −∑i∈I Pmini −∑i∈I Pmaxi ,
Q =
∑
i∈I Pi,
I = {i : R ≥ αi + βiPmaxi }, I = {i : R ≤ αi + βiPmini },
I = {1, . . . , N} \ {I ∪ I},
where R is the market clearing price, Qforecast is the demand forecast (or as-bid
load as is also the case in actual electricity markets) that is publicly announced
by the market operator, Pmini , P
max
i are the minimum and maximum generation
levels, respectively, of supplier i, I is the set of suppliers producing at Pmaxi , I
is the set of suppliers producing at Pmini , I the set of marginal suppliers, and
Q the effective demand met by marginal suppliers.
Since for i ∈ I the capacity constraints are not binding, for a given Qforecast
(hence, Q) the solution to (1) becomes
R(α,β;Q) =
Q+
∑
i∈I
αi
βi∑
i∈I
1
βi
, (2)
Pi(α,β;Q) =
R(α,β;Q)− αi
βi
, i ∈ I,
Pi(α,β;Q) = P
min
i , i ∈ I, Pi(α,β;Q) = Pmaxi , i ∈ I,
where we write R(α,β;Q), Pi(α,β;Q) to explicitly express the dependency on
α , (α1, . . . , αN ) and β , (β1, . . . , βN ) for a given demand forecast resulting
in effective demand Q.
3 Forward Problem Formulation
The forward problem deals with the individual profit maximization problem, in
which supplier i determines her bidding curve (αi, βi) to maximize her profit
φi(α,β;Q) defined as
φi(α,β;Q) = R(α,β;Q)Pi(α,β, Q)− Ci(Pi(α,β;Q)),
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where Ci(Pi(α,β;Q)) is the production cost at generation level Pi(α,β;Q).
The problem is formulated as follows:
max
αi,βi
φi(α,β;Q)
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ α¯,
βi > 0,
(3)
where α¯ is an upper bound on αi, and is related to the price cap in electricity
markets. 1
Note that the form of the profit function is generic (defined as revenues minus
costs) and, in general, each supplier can have her own cost function. For the
case of electricity generators, a common assumption is a quadratic cost function:
Ci(Pi) = ci0 + ci1Pi + ci2P
2
i , (4)
which implies a marginal cost equal to ci1 + 2ci2Pi. Since the intercept of the
quadratic cost function (parameter ci0) is constant (this practically refers to
the so-called “no-load” cost of a generator), its value will not affect the profit
maximization problem of the supplier and, without loss of generality, it can be
set to zero.
A direct comparison of the marginal cost (ci1 + 2ci2Pi) and the linear bid
function (αi + βiPi) indicates that the cost parameters ci1 and 2ci2 correspond
to the bidding curve parameters αi and βi, respectively. Hence, truthful bidding
would result in αi = ci1 and βi = 2ci2.
In this paper, we assume that suppliers game only with parameter αi, and
that βi is small and equal to 2ci2, representing a publicly known, technology-
specific efficiency decline associated with approaching generating capacity. This
assumption corresponds to the “bid-α” game in [29], implying that βi is known
to other suppliers for all intents and purposes. We elaborate on this assumption
next.
The technology and capacity of individual generating plants is public in-
formation that provides useful partial information about their cost functions.
Nevertheless, their fuel and variable maintenance cost, and their exact heat rate
(efficiency), reflected primarily in parameter ci1, is proprietary and not known
with sufficient accuracy to competitors so as to allow them to bid optimally.
On the other hand, as also pointed out in [30], the marginal cost functions of
individual suppliers usually have very shallow slopes, and thus βi is relatively
small (about two orders of magnitude lower than αi); furthermore, if both αi
and βi can be chosen, the existence of a unique equilibrium is rare. Hence,
one can argue that the small value of the slope of the marginal cost (2ci2) is
more or less known, and that the suppliers reflect this cost in parameter βi,
2
as in [30], thus avoiding bidding non credible high slopes. Still, in our results
1Strictly speaking, the price cap imposes a bound on the marginal cost at the maximum
capacity, αi + βiPmaxi ≤ α¯, implying that the upper bound is different for each supplier i,
i.e., α¯i = α¯− βiPmaxi . However, in practice, the price cap is high enough, and we can assume
without loss of generality a common upper bound on αi.
2The parameter βi reflects (i) the smoothing/regularization of the bid conforming to the
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section, we mainly explore cases in which we allow errors in the estimates of past
bids or the knowledge of parameters (including parameter βi). Furthermore, we
note that if we consider the framework from the perspective of a regulator, the
technology-specific data (e.g., heat-rate curves) that mainly drive the slope of
the marginal cost are declared by the participants; as such, the slope is relatively
easily calculated.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that ci1 consists of two cost com-
ponents: (i) one non-fuel cost component that reflects operational and main-
tenance variable costs (e.g., labor, parts, consumables, lubricants, chemicals,
consumption from power station supplies, etc.), and (ii) a fuel-cost component
(essentially depending on the heat rate and the fuel price). As such, ci1 is
defined as
ci1 = θi1 + θi2ξ, (5)
where ξ is a variable reflecting the publicly known fuel price, and θi1, θi2 are
the unknown cost coefficients. This decomposition is in line with the declared
characteristics of the generation units, which comprise the heat rate curve and
operational (other than fuel) and maintenance variable costs. We note that
the framework can support even more detailed decompositions (e.g., consider
separately a carbon price for emissions). Also, we note that the unknown cost
coefficients can be interpreted in various ways. For instance, assuming a pub-
licly known fuel price ξ, coefficient θi2 may contain the combined effect of the
heat rate curve and potential discounts that suppliers may have secured; such
contract information is not available to either regulators or competitors.
Following the above assumptions, i.e., setting ci0 = 0 and ci2 = (1/2)βi in
the quadratic cost function (4), and using (5), the profit function for supplier i
can be rewritten as
φi(α,β;Q, ξ) =[R(α,β;Q)− (θi1 + θi2ξ)]Pi(α,β;Q)
− 1
2
βi[Pi(α,β;Q)]
2. (6)
Note that for a givenQ and ξ, the profit of supplier i is determined by the actions
α of all players and her own cost parameter θi , (θi1, θi2). We therefore write
φi(θi;α, Q, ξ) to emphasize this dependency (β is removed since it is constant
and known).
Since all suppliers choose their bids by solving the profit maximization prob-
lem (3), we can construct a SFE model describing the game among all profit-
maximizing suppliers. By definition, a specific α is a Nash equilibrium if no
single supplier can increase her profit by unilaterally changing her own bid. We
know (see [28]) that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium α∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α
∗
N )
in this SFE model, since φi(θi;α, Q, ξ) is strictly concave in αi, i.e., its second
partial derivative is strictly negative.
monotonically increasing market rule requirement (marginal costs are physically not strictly
monotonic), and (ii) the advantage of and desire for achieving unique price-directed marginal
generator schedules. In the experiments, the values of βi are on the order of 0.1.
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Next, we compute both the first and the second partial derivatives of the
profit function with respect to αi. From (6), the first derivative is
∇iφi(θi;α, Q, ξ) =
1
βi
[βˆiQi + αi(βˆ
2
i − 1)− (βˆi − 1)(θi1 + θi2ξ)], (7)
where 0 < βˆi = (1/βi)/
∑
l∈I(1/βl) < 1, andQi = (Q+
∑
k∈I,k 6=i αk/βk)/
∑
l∈I(1/βl).
We observe that the first derivative is linear in αi and also linear in θi1 and θi2.
From (7), the second derivative is
∇2iiφi(θi;α, Q, ξ) =
1
βi
(βˆi − 1)(βˆi + 1). (8)
From (8), it is easy to verify that ∇2iiφi(θi;α, Q, ξ) < 0, which implies strict
concavity since βi > 0 and 0 < βˆi < 1.
4 Inverse Problem Formulation
The inverse problem seeks to estimate rivals’ cost parameters. This knowledge
is required for estimating the objective of the profit maximization problem (3).
The main theoretical foundation is attributed to [20], where the authors estimate
the utility functions of the players in a Nash game from the observed equilibrium.
In the context of this paper, we are given (or we can obtain/estimate) M
past equilibrium bids (observations) αj = (αji ; i ∈ Ij), j = 1, . . . ,M , where
Ij is the set of marginal suppliers for observation j and is defined similar to
I in (2). The αj are realized under different residual demand levels Qj and
fuel prices ξj , and we are interested in estimating θi of supplier i = 1, . . . , N .
Without loss of generality, we assume that for each supplier i there are sufficient
observations j at which supplier i was marginal (i.e., i ∈ Ij), so that there is
enough information to estimate θi. In case this is not true for some suppliers,
we can a priori remove them from the set {1, . . . , N} (and appropriately adjust
(1)). For such suppliers, we simply do not have enough information to estimate
their cost parameters. It should be noted, however, that these suppliers will
generally correspond to base loaded units that do not compete in the market.
Given the quadratic cost function representation, the resulting linear supply
curve is associated with a broadly construed notion of marginality that will
render non-base-loaded units marginal during some hours. As long as each unit
is marginal in some of the observations – not all units need to be marginal in
all observations – the proposed framework is broadly applicable, and there is no
loss of generality from the exclusion of base loaded units.
The estimates for the cost parameters are obtained by applying [20, Theorem
3], which is derived through duality, and leads to the following optimization
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problem:
min
y,ǫ
θ1,...,θN
‖ǫ‖∞
s.t. yji ≥ 0, i ∈ Ij ; j = 1, . . . ,M,
yji ≥ ∇iφi(θi;αj , Qj, ξj), ∀i ∈ Ij , j,∑
i∈Ij
(
α¯yji − αji∇iφi(θi;αj , Qj, ξj)
)
≤ ǫj, ∀j,
∇iφi(θi;αki , Qki , ξki) = φinorm, ∀i,
(9)
where y = (yji )
i∈Ij
j=1,...,M is the decision variable (introduced as a dual variable
in [20, Theorem 2]); ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫM ), ‖ǫ‖∞ = maxj |ǫj | is the infinity norm,
and the last constraint is used for normalization purposes and will be discussed
below. We note that the variables in ∇iφi are θi, and that ∇iφi is linear in θi,
where αj , Qj , and ξj are parameters of the optimization problem. From (7), we
have
∇iφi(θi;αj , Qj, ξj) = βˆi
βi
Qj +
∑
m∈Ij,m 6=i
αjm
βm∑
l∈Ij
1
βl
+
αji
βi
(βˆ2i − 1) + θi1
1− βˆi
βi
+ θi2
1− βˆi
βi
ξj . (10)
Interestingly, we can reformulate the optimization problem (9) as a Linear
Programming (LP) problem, which can be solved very efficiently. Specifically,
instead of the infinite norm objective, we can introduce constraints that impose
an upper bound to each |ǫj | and then minimize this upper bound.
The last constraint in (9) is a normalization constraint, which is equivalent
to [20, Eqs. (39d) and (39e)]. The right hand side (rhs) of the constraint, φi
norm,
is some estimate of the partial derivative at a specific point, which is evaluated
at an observation ki (potentially different for each i). In [20], for illustration
purposes, the rhs estimate is obtained using the actual values of θi at a median
observation, considering some lower bounds for the bidding coefficients. We
further elaborate on the implementation of this constraint in Section 5.
We note that this inverse optimization technique still applies even when more
constraints are imposed in the forward problem setup or when the bid function
is changed, as long as R and Pi have closed-form expressions w.r.t. the bidding
coefficients.
The quality of the computed equilibrium strategies depends on the explana-
tory value of the estimated cost parameters. Indeed, good estimators should
explain future equilibria as well as the equilibria used to estimate them. The
following result, which is a restatement of [20, Theorem 6], ensures the quality
of the estimated cost functions under mild conditions. To simplify the notation,
we assume that all suppliers are marginal at all past observations j; otherwise,
proper adjustments to the statement of the theorem can be made.
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Theorem 4.1. Suppose that αj , j = 1, . . . ,M are i.i.d. realizations of a
random variable α˜, and α˜ ∈ {α : 0 ≤ αi ≤ α¯, ∀ i} almost surely. Then,
for any 0 < δ < 1, with probability at least 1− η w.r.t. the sampling,
P
(
α˜ is a z-approximate equilibrium for the game
with payoffs defined through θˆ1, . . . , θˆN
) ≥ 1− δ, (11)
where η =
∑2N
i=0
(
M
i
)
δi(1 − δ)M−i; z is the optimal value of problem (9); and
θˆ1, . . . , θˆN are the optimal solutions to (9).
Roughly speaking, the z-approximate equilibrium describes the situation
where each supplier does not necessarily play her best action given what others
are doing, playing instead a strategy that is no worse than z relative to the
best response. For the definition of z-approximate equilibrium, we refer the
interested reader to [20, Section 2.2].
There are two probability measures in the statement of Theorem 4.1. One is
related to the new data α˜, while the other is related to the samples α1, . . . ,αM .
The probability in (11) is taken w.r.t. the new data α˜. For a fixed set of
samples, (11) holds with probability at least 1−η w.r.t. the measure of samples.
Theorem 4.1 essentially states that given typical samples, the probability that
the estimated cost functions explain well a new future equilibrium is bounded
below. It guarantees the accuracy of the estimated cost parameters under mild
conditions.
5 Algorithmic Implementation
In this section, we present the algorithmic implementation for estimating the
rivals’ profit functions (or cost parameters θi), which can then be used to obtain
equilibrium bids. We use historical data from which we can derive the past bids.
Suppose we are aware of the market clearing price and the dispatch schedules
of all suppliers. 3 Using this information, the past bids αj = (αji ; i ∈ Ij),
j = 1, . . . ,M , can be computed via the market-clearing condition in (1), where
β is constant and known. As before, we assume that for each supplier i there
are sufficient observations j at which supplier i was marginal (i ∈ Ij).
It is worth mentioning that (9) might give multiple optimal solutions. Our
goal is to recover the true cost parameters from this set. Although there might
be multiple cost function estimates that can explain the observed equilibria
well, only true costs are expected to have good out-of-sample performance. The
following Algorithm is thus proposed to identify the true cost functions, based on
which equilibrium bids could be computed via an iterative best response process.
We refer to this algorithm as “random search,” since it searches randomly in the
3Such information is publicly available in some European power markets, or it can be
assumed to be discoverable at a later point in time by market participants. It is certainly
available to regulators even in pool-based markets, and, to some extent, it can be estimated
by entities with market knowledge; as we will discuss later, errors in the estimates can be
viewed as noise in the data.
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set of optimal solutions until the one that performs well on a validation dataset
is found.
In what follows, we present the main steps of the Algorithm. We define d to
be the average discrepancy between computed and true bids on the validation
dataset, which evaluates the out-of-sample performance of our solution. The
parameter k counts the total number of iterations (random searches). The
Algorithm stops when the discrepancy d is small enough or the total number of
iterations exceeds a limit.
1: Input: N suppliers, with constant and known bidding slopes βi, i =
1, . . . , N ; M past bids (observations), and for each bid j = 1, . . . ,M , the
market-clearing price Rj , residual demand Qj , fuel price ξj , dispatch sched-
ules P ji , upper bound for bids α¯; percentage of training samples p; tolerance
level τ ; maximum number of iterations MaxIter.
2: Initialize: d =∞, k = 0.
3: while d ≥ τ and k < MaxIter do
4: k ← k + 1. Randomly choose Mt = ⌊Mp⌋ samples from all past bids
(observations) to constitute the training dataset (as a percentage p of the
entire set), and use the remaining bids (Mv = M −Mt) as the validation
dataset.
5: Obtain θˆi, i = 1, . . . , N , by solving problem (9) using the training
dataset.
6: Compute equilibrium strategies (solving (3) via an iterative best re-
sponse process) αˆjval, j = 1, . . . ,Mv, on the validation dataset using θˆi, i =
1, . . . , N .
7: Evaluate the discrepancy between computed and true bids on the vali-
dation dataset as
d =
∑Mv
j=1 ‖αjval − αˆjval‖1/N
Mv
, (12)
where αjval is the j-th true bid (obtained form the historical data) on the
validation dataset, and ‖· ‖1 is the ℓ1 norm operator defined as the sum of
the absolute elements of the argument.
8: end while
9: Compute equilibrium bids using θˆi, i = 1, . . . , N for given Q and ξ.
The iterative best response process mentioned in step 6 for computing equi-
librium bids (which also applies to step 9) is a standard fixed point iteration
process. Each supplier solves problem (3) assuming all other suppliers are fixed
in their previous bids (in fact, problem (3) in our case can be solved even an-
alytically). Then the bids are updated and the process is repeated until an
equilibrium is reached, i.e., no supplier can gain by unilaterally changing her
bid. In practice, this process terminates in a few iterations since the profit
functions are strictly concave.
We also note that the algorithm is amenable to parallelization, as essen-
tially, given adequate resources, all iterations (steps 3 to 8) could be run in
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parallel. Our next result establishes that the algorithm requires more than T
iterations with a probability that diminishes exponentially with T . Equiva-
lently, we can select a large enough maximum number of iterations, MaxIter,
so that the algorithm will terminate before MaxIter is reached with a desirable
large probability. The result further establishes that the convergence rate of the
algorithm improves as we increase the size Mt of the training set. The proof
of the result is included in the Appendix. We numerically explore in Section
6 the out-of-sample performance of the cost estimators obtained through this
algorithm.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that for some γ > 0, (1 − βˆ2i )/βi ≥ γ, ∀i = 1, . . . , N ,
and the conditions of Thm. 4.1 hold. Assuming that all the past bids are at most
ǫ¯ away from the equilibrium, and for a threshold τ =
√
ǫ¯/(Nγ), it follows:
1. for any T ≥ 1, the probability that the algorithm terminates after T itera-
tions is no more than ηT ;
2. for any 0 < ǫ < 1, when T ≥ (log ǫ)/(log η), the probability that the
algorithm terminates after T iterations is no more than ǫ,
where η is defined in the statement of Thm. 4.1. Moreover, as we increase the
training sample size Mt, the number of iterations that are needed for termination
decreases when Mt is large enough.
Another issue mentioned in the previous section is the implementation of
the normalization constraint, i.e., the last constraint in (9). For the purposes
of this paper, unlike [20], we do not use the true costs (since they are indeed
unknown); instead, we set the rhs (estimate of the partial derivative) to zero for
the median observation of the training dataset.
Finally, we note that the algorithm can handle cases in which “noise” is
present in the data, e.g., in the past bids (observations). This is perhaps the
most interesting — and not trivial, application which we also explore in Section
6.
6 Numerical Illustration
In this section, we use synthetic input data to test the validity of our approach.
We first describe the experimental setup.
We consider a setup with N = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 suppliers. For each case, we
assume that the true cost parameters θi1 and θi2, as well as ci2 of supplier i are
equispaced in the intervals [7, 5], [0.7, 0.9], and [0.05, 0.07], respectively. 4
We generate M = 200 past observations, in which demand Q and fuel price
ξ are randomly selected within the intervals [50, 100], and [10, 30], respectively.
For each demand and fuel price realization, i.e., for each observation j (among
4For instance, for the case N = 3, we have for supplier 1, θ11 = 7, θ12 = 0.7, c12 = 0.05, for
supplier 2, θ21 = 6, θ22 = 0.8, c22 = 0.06, and for supplier 3, θ31 = 5, θ32 = 0.9, c32 = 0.07.
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the 200), using the true cost estimators, we generate equilibrium bids αj, as-
suming that all suppliers are marginal at all observations. The upper bound
α¯ is set to 200. 5 The training and validation datasets are assumed to be of
equal size, Mt = Mv = 100, using p = 0.5. For evaluating the out-of-sample
performance we generate a test dataset with 100 additional demand and fuel
price values, randomly selected within the aforementioned intervals.
The algorithm was implemented using Matlab R2017a and Gurobi 7.5.1 (for
solving the LP problem (9)), without any parallelization, and the computational
experiments were run on an Intel i7 5500U, at 2.4GHz, with 8 GB RAM.
In what follows, we consider two setups: a “clean” setup without noise in the
data (Subsection 6.1), and a setup with noise (Subsection 6.2). We evaluate the
out-of-sample performance for the noisy data case (in Subsection 6.3), and we
perform sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters (in Subsection 6.4).
Lastly, we present a interesting comparison of our approach with a method
introduced in [13] (Subsection 6.5).
6.1 “Clean” Setup
As a measure of error for the cost estimators of θi, we use the Mean Absolute
Percentage Error (MAPE), defined as (100/2N)
∑N
i=1
∑2
l=1 |(θil− θˆil)/θil|. No-
tably, we expect to see that cost parameters with low discrepancy values would
exhibit low MAPE values. In all cases, the algorithm managed to exactly reveal
the true costs within 1 or 2 iterations for N = 2, 3, 4, 5 and 86 iterations for
N = 10. We plot the results for N = 10, in Fig. 1. Each circle corresponds
to the discrepancy and MAPE values on the validation dataset for a certain
partition of the samples into training/validation datasets.
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Figure 1: Validation dataset performance (N = 10 suppliers, “clean” setup).
In Fig. 1 we see that in general, the lower the discrepancy (the better the
performance in the validation set), the lower the MAPE of the cost estimators
(the better the estimates of the true costs).
5Note that, in practice, we would estimate these bids, using the market outcomes.
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6.2 Setup with Noise
We introduce noise in past bid observations, by generating them within 1% of
the optimal value obtained by the iterative best response process. Alternatively,
one may think of this noise as an error in estimating past bids from the market
results. For instance, noisy data may be due to errors in estimates of the market
outcome when not all data required (e.g., the exact schedules) are available, or
due to errors in the slopes of the marginal cost function (reflected in parameter
βi). In a more loose interpretation of approximate equilibria, one may also
think of this noise as observations in which suppliers do not play exactly their
equilibrium bids.
For practical purposes, we set MaxIter = 10, 000 and a tight tolerance level
τ = 10−3. In all cases the iteration limit is reached first; computational times
ranged from 5 to 10 min. We note that by selecting such a tight tolerance
level in absolute figures (with an average bid α of around 20, the algorithm
would terminate when reaching discrepancies lower than 0.005%), and with 1%
noise present in the data, it is almost certain that the algorithm will terminate
by reaching the iteration limit. Hence, it is highly unlikely that such tight
tolerance limits (which are achieved in the clean setup) will be also achievable
in the case of noisy data. Nevertheless, we keep both termination conditions in
the framework for the sake of completeness in case of noise-free data, to avoid
unnecessary iterations. We also note that, by setting a relatively high iteration
limit, we enhance the confidence in our results (see also Thm. 5.1); we elaborate
further on the selection of this limit in Subsection 6.4.
For all cases (N = 2, . . . , 5, 10), the best achieved discrepancy at the val-
idation dataset ranges from 0.111 to 0.154 in absolute figures — an average
bid α of around 20 implies that the discrepancy is less than 1%. The results
indicate reasonably good cost estimators with MAPE ranging from 0.86% to
3.44% (for the aforementioned best achieved discrepancies). In Fig. 2, we show
the performance in the validation dataset for N = 10 suppliers — compare with
Fig. 1 for the “clean” setup. Fig. 2 also verifies the expected behavior when
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Figure 2: Validation dataset performance (N = 10 suppliers, setup with noise).
14
noise is present in the data, i.e., good performance in the validation dataset is
associated with good cost estimators.
In Fig. 3, we plot the true costs θi1 and θi2 and their estimates for N = 5
and N = 10 suppliers. We illustrate the best estimate (the one that corre-
sponds to the lowest discrepancy calculated at the validation dataset), as well
as the average cost estimators and their standard deviation (σ) over the 10,000
iterations.
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Figure 3: True costs and estimates (best and average +/-σ) for N = 5 (upper
figure) and N = 10 (lower figure) suppliers. Values of θi1 are shown on the left
axis; values of θi2 are shown on the right axis.
The results indicate that the best estimates range from −3.9% (−2.3%) to
2% (2.2%) for θi1, and from −1% (−0.4%) to 2% (1.3%) for θi2 for the case
of N = 5 (N = 10) suppliers. The best estimates, which the Algorithm is
designed to obtain, are reasonably close to the true cost parameters, and hence,
they are expected to exhibit good out-of-sample performance. In fact, even the
average estimates over the 10,000 iterations are not too far from the true cost
parameters.
Next, we evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the best cost estimators
using the test dataset (100 observations, different from the 200 observations
that were used for the training and validation datasets).
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6.3 Out-of-Sample Performance
For each observation (i.e., value of Q and ξ) of the test dataset, we compare the
equilibrium bids using the estimates of θˆi with bids derived using the true costs
θi, and we calculate the discrepancy (d) — using (12) with Mv = 1. We sum-
marize the results (average discrepancy — in absolute figures, and its standard
deviation) in Table 1. In Fig. 4, we illustrate the values of the discrepancy for
each observation of the test dataset for the case of N = 5 suppliers.
Table 1: Out-of-Sample Performance of Best Cost Estimators
Suppliers Avg. Discrepancy (d) Std of d
2 0.086 0.0555
3 0.047 0.0228
4 0.052 0.0167
5 0.063 0.0220
10 0.104 0.0218
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Figure 4: Discrepancy of bids using the best cost estimators over the test dataset
(N = 5 suppliers).
The results in Table 1 and Fig. 4 indicate a satisfactory out-of-sample per-
formance. In fact, the average discrepancy is lower than the best achieved over
the validation set. The reason is that the validation dataset contains noise,
whereas the test dataset is a “clean,” free of noise setup.
We then take a closer look at the equilibrium bids and profits. We consider
3 instances of demand and fuel price: (a) Q = 45, ξ = 8, (b) Q = 75, ξ = 20,
and (c) Q = 110, ξ = 35. Note that instance (b) refers to the mean demand and
mean fuel price of the past bids, whereas instances (a) and (c) contain values
that are outside the intervals used for generating the past bids, i.e., that fall
outside the range of previously observed values. For each instance, we list the
discrepancy values (in absolute figures) in Table 2.
We show the equilibrium bids (αi) for the three instances, and for N = 2,
3, 4, 5 and 10 suppliers, in Fig. 5.
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Table 2: Discrepancy of Equilibrium Bids (Estimates vs True Costs)
Instance (a) Instance (b) Instance (c)
Suppliers Q = 45, ξ = 8 Q = 75, ξ = 20 Q = 110, ξ = 35
2 0.154 0.037 0.278
3 0.048 0.041 0.114
4 0.104 0.035 0.111
5 0.062 0.059 0.140
10 0.064 0.100 0.162
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Figure 5: Equilibrium bids using true costs and estimates for instances (a), (b)
and (c) and N = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 suppliers (setup with noise).
From Fig. 5 we see that the difference between the equilibrium bids using the
estimates compared to the ones using the true costs is very small. For example,
for the case N = 5 suppliers, the difference ranges from −0.135 to 0.047 for
instance (a), from −0.074 to 0.133 for instance (b), and from −0.076 to 0.351
for instance (c). The differences reported as percentages range from −1.1% to
0.4%, from −0.3% to 0.6%, and from −0.2% to 1%, for instances (a), (b), and
(c), respectively.
Lastly, we provide in Table 3 the total profits for the three instances, cal-
culated using (6); the profits using the estimated costs are shown first and the
profits using the true costs follow in parenthesis for comparison. Apart from
the expected behavior of total profits decreasing when the number of supplier
increases, and total profits increasing with increasing demand, the results also
show that the differences using the estimated costs are very small (in fact the
relative differences are within 5%).
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Table 3: Total Profits using Estimates (vs True Costs)
Instance (a) Instance (b) Instance (c)
Suppliers Q = 45, ξ = 8 Q = 75, ξ = 20 Q = 110, ξ = 35
2 188.8 (181.7) 516.0 (518.7) 1122.5 (1151.0)
3 81.3 (80.4) 230.6 (233.7) 525.7 (537.5)
4 51.5 (50.3) 150.8 (150.0) 358.4 (361.1)
5 34.5 (36.4) 113.5 (111.7) 294.9 (283.6)
10 15.1 (15.3) 61.4 (58.3) 206.0 (195.8)
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the level of
noise, the number of available observations, and the number of iterations. As a
base case, we consider the case for N = 5 suppliers.
6.4.1 Noise Level
As already mentioned, introducing noise in the past bids can be thought of
as introducing errors in obtaining the past bids from the available or estimated
market data. In the previous subsections, we assumed a noise level of 1%; in this
subsection, we explore higher noise levels (2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, and 10%), and we
present the results for the performance on the validation dataset (discrepancy
vs. MAPE) in Fig. 6.
Figure 6: Validation dataset performance, N = 5 suppliers, various noise levels.
The best discrepancy achieved ranges from 0.116 (noise level 1%) to 1.204
(noise level 10%). MAPE values range from 1.75% to 10.46%. The results
verify the expected behavior, i.e., discrepancy and MAPE increase with the
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noise level. They also verify that good performance in the validation dataset
(low discrepancies) is associated with good estimators (low MAPE), under all
noise levels. Table 4 presents the out-of-sample performance under various noise
levels. The results are in good agreement with the ones presented in Table 1.
They also indicate low average discrepancies, which increase with the noise level.
Note that at high noise levels (see e.g., 10%) the standard deviation becomes
low, indicating that the discrepancy is mostly affected by the noise.
Table 4: Out-of-Sample Performance of Best Cost Estimators, N = 5 Suppliers,
Various Noise Levels
Noise Level Avg. Discrepancy (d) Std of d
1% 0.063 0.0220
2% 0.152 0.0373
3% 0.219 0.0802
4% 0.303 0.0895
5% 0.380 0.1210
10% 0.614 0.0181
6.4.2 Past Observations
In the previous subsections, we considered a dataset with M = 200 available
past observations. In this subsection, we explore the market outcome for various
numbers of past observations (20, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1000), for N = 5
suppliers, and noise level 1%. Fig. 7 illustrates the out-of-sample performance
of the best cost estimators.
Figure 7: Out-of-sample performance of best cost estimators (average discrep-
ancy +/-σ), N = 5 suppliers, noise level 1%, various numbers of past observa-
tions.
Not surprisingly, and as predicted by Thm. 4.1, Fig. 7 shows that the out-of-
sample performance improves with the number of available past observations.
From Thm. 4.1 we see that as the number of past observations M increases,
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the probability that our estimates θˆ1, . . . , θˆN yield an equilibrium that is close
to the true one increases, since η decreases (this can be seen from the proof in
the Appendix). This implies that increasing the training sample size could lead
to a small discrepancy between computed and true bids, and thus an improved
out-of-sample performance, which is consistent with the observation in Fig. 7.
Interestingly, even with 20 available observations, the performance discrepancy
is reasonable. We also checked the average discrepancies (out-of-sample perfor-
mance) for the various noise levels with only 20 observations and the results are
also good; average discrepancies range from 0.107 to 0.852 (increasing with the
level of noise) with standard deviations that range from 0.0241 to 0.0644.
6.4.3 Number of Iterations
Last but not least, we elaborate on the selection of the maximum number of
iterations, i.e., the termination condition. Thm. 5.1 yielded a rigorous result
that provides guidance on how to select the iteration limit. Here, we numerically
verify that a small number of iterations is sufficient to provide some good enough
estimators.
Figure 8: Discrepancy values calculated in the validation dataset (step 7 of the
algorithm) at each iteration (shown for the first 100 iterations), N = 5 suppliers,
noise level 1%.
In Fig. 8, we show the values of the discrepancy calculated in the validation
dataset at each iteration k, for the case of N = 5 suppliers with noise level
1%. For ease of exposition, we plotted the first 100 iterations of the algorithm
(out of the 10,000). The results indicate that good enough estimators (with
low discrepancy) can be obtained early in the process. In fact, in the first 100
iterations, we observed 7 instances with discrepancies that are less than 10%
higher than the best achieved (which in our tests was 0.116). We elaborate on
this indication in the following figure.
Fig. 9 shows the maximum average discrepancy (+/- σ) computed over the
top x% of the iterations ranked in ascending order of discrepancy computed over
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Figure 9: Out-of-sample performance of cost estimators (maximum average dis-
crepancy +/-σ), N = 5 suppliers, noise level 1%, top x% (x-axis) of iterations
(ranked in ascending order of discrepancy).
the same test dataset. For instance, for the top 1%, i.e., the top 100 iterations
out of 10,000, the worst achieved out-of-sample performance was an average
d = 0.100 with σ = 0.0167.
Lastly, we investigate the relationship between discrepancy values and the
total profits. In Fig. 10, we show the values of the discrepancy and the total
profits calculated in the validation dataset at each iteration, for the case of N =
5 suppliers, M = 200 past observations with noise level 1%, and MaxIter =
10, 000 iterations. It can be seen that the larger the discrepancy is, the smaller
the total profits, which validates the use of the discrepancy as a performance
metric in identifying the best cost estimators.
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Figure 10: Total profits vs. discrepancy values calculated in the validation
dataset, N = 5 suppliers, noise level 1%, 200 observations, 10,000 iterations.
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6.5 Comparison with the Method in [13]
In this subsection, we compare the performance of our approach with the method
introduced in [13], which assumes that the bidding coefficients of any rival sup-
plier follow a bivariate normal distribution whose mean and covariance could
be inferred from the past observed bids. The profit maximization problem for a
single supplier i is then reformulated to involve only αi and βi, with the market
clearing price R and the production level Pi evaluated at the mean bids of the
rival suppliers.
We note that [13] does not estimate rivals’ cost functions; it calculates the
bids using as input the mean and covariance of rivals’ bidding coefficients. In
our setup, since we assume that the bidding slope β is known, only the mean
and variance of α need to be inferred from the historical data. For the needs of
our comparisons, we use the noisy setup with 1% noise level.
We evaluate the performance of [13] on the test dataset (that contains 100
equilibrium bids). The average discrepancy between the solution obtained us-
ing [13] and the equilibrium bids on the test dataset is shown in Table 5 (the
differences with the values presented in Table 1 that are obtained using our
approach are shown in parentheses). The results show that [13] leads to signif-
icantly higher discrepancies (as well as higher standard deviations), indicating
that our approach obtains a more accurate prediction of the bids.
Table 5: Average Discrepancy of Bids on the Test Dataset Using [13] (Differences
with Table 1)
Suppliers Avg. Discrepancy (d) Std. of d
2 1.406 (+1.32) 0.7891 (+0.73)
3 1.026 (+0.98) 0.5709 (+0.55)
4 0.818 (+0.77) 0.4551 (+0.44)
5 0.681 (+0.62) 0.3793 (+0.36)
10 0.372 (+0.27) 0.2071 (+0.19)
We then take a closer look at the bids and profits by considering the 3
instances illustrated in Section 6.3. In Table 6 we list the discrepancy of bids
obtained using [13] (in parentheses we show the differences with the values listed
in Table 2). The results show that for instance (b), which represents instances
that have been constantly observed in the past, [13] achieves a comparable per-
formance with our approach, and occasionally even lower discrepancies. How-
ever, the performance of [13] is much worse for instances (a) and (c), which
contain values that were outside the range of past observations. The reason is
that [13] implicitly assumes that rivals’ bidding behavior is similar to what has
been observed in the past, which results in a large bias when a new, unseen
scenario occurs. By contrast, through estimating rivals’ cost functions from the
past bids, our approach acquires more information, and exhibits a stronger out-
of-sample inference capability that guarantees a low estimation bias for every
possible scenario. Interestingly but not surprisingly, [13] achieves better results
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when the number of suppliers is large, in which case the bids are very close (due
to competition), see e.g., Fig. 5.
Table 6: Discrepancy of Bids Using [13] (Differences with Table 2)
Instance (a) Instance (b) Instance (c)
Suppliers Q = 45, ξ = 8 Q = 75, ξ = 20 Q = 110, ξ = 35
2 3.773 (+3.62) 0.048 (+ 0.01) 4.776 (+4.50)
3 2.487 (+2.44) 0.050 (+0.01) 3.211 (+3.10)
4 1.923 (+1.82) 0.043 (+0.01) 2.497 (+2.39)
5 1.581 (+1.52) 0.037 (-0.02) 2.057 (+1.92)
10 0.849 (+0.79) 0.021 (-0.08) 1.108 (+0.95)
In Table 7 we list the total profits for the bids derived using [13], and we
show in parentheses the differences with the values in Table 3 obtained using
the cost estimates. Recall that the profits obtained using the cost estimates are
very close to the profits obtained using the true costs (within +/- 5%). For
instance (b), the two methods obtain similar profits. For instance (c) which
represents higher demands and fuel prices, our approach achieves much higher
profits. The opposite is true for instance (a), which represents lower demands
and fuel prices. This is an interesting result, which is explained by the fact that
the bids generated using [13] are biased by the mean past bids. Hence, they
tend to be values of past observations, i.e., they are inflated for the instances
of lower demands and fuel prices, and they are reduced for higher demands and
fuel prices. More specifically, the values of the equilibrium bids are about 25%
higher in instance (a), and about 12% lower in instance (c) compared to the ones
shown in Fig. 5. Of course, in instance (a) where the bids (and hence, profits)
are inflated, the conditions are ripe for a new supplier to come in, underbid,
and capture significant market share.
Table 7: Total Profits of Estimated Bids Using [13] (Differences with Table 3
Using Estimates)
Instance (a) Instance (b) Instance (c)
Suppliers Q = 45, ξ = 8 Q = 75, ξ = 20 Q = 110, ξ = 35
2 350.2 (+161.40) 515.3 (-0.70) 636.0 (-486.50)
3 192.4 (+111.10) 230.0 (-0.60) 186.2 (-339.50)
4 137.1 (+85.60) 146.7 (-4.10) 87.0 (-271.40)
5 107.7 (+73.20) 108.9 (-4.60) 57.4 (-237.50)
10 53.7 (+38.60) 56.8 (-4.60) 73.7 (-132.30)
In conclusion, our approach possesses a stronger out-of-sample inference ca-
pability attributed to the estimation of the cost functions. The method proposed
in [13] ignores the interaction among suppliers, assumes a normal distribution
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and uses only the mean values of the past bids to infer rivals’ behavior, which
accounts for its unsatisfactory performance in new, unseen scenarios.
7 Extension to Location-Dependent Prices
So far, we assumed competition among suppliers in uncongested networks. In-
deed, several day-ahead electricity markets clear ignoring network congestion.
In the instance of such day-ahead market rules, the system operator adjusts the
generation dispatch to observe line flow capacity constraints and ensure secure
and reliable operation.
In U.S. markets, however, the transmission system representation has been
part of the standard market design for many years, with resulting “Locational
Marginal Prices” (LMPs) representing the marginal cost at each node of the
transmission system. In practice, without entering in a detailed analysis of how
LMPs are formed, we note that “price islands” may characterize clearing prices,
differing only slightly to reflect varying loss factors.
Our method appears to assume away the fact that network connected mar-
kets result in location dependent clearing price differentials driven by (i) small
effects of location-specific line loss contributions, but also, (ii) significant contri-
butions during network congestion events. It can capture and address, however,
significant congestion-caused differentials by detecting market-splitting occur-
rences that result in “price islands” with essentially homogeneous prices within
each island. Although this limits the number of relevant observations when price
islanding occurs, it utilizes the unusually high or low price events associated with
congestion.
Our approach applies to price islands where congestion is a result of genera-
tors outside of the relevant island, who do not set the price and, hence, are not
part of our analysis. In this context, the market clearing price in each island
s is Rs = αi + βiPi, i ∈ Is, where Is is the set of marginal suppliers in island
s. The residual demand in each island is Qs =
∑
i∈Is
Pi. Similarly to (2), the
solution for island s, in terms of price and quantity, is
Rs(αs,βs;Qs) =
Qs +
∑
i∈Is
αi
βi∑
i∈Is
1
βi
,
Pi(αs,βs;Qs) =
Rs(αs,βs;Qs)− αi
βi
, i ∈ Is,
where αs,βs refer to suppliers in island s.
In the forward problem, the profit of the suppliers in each island is therefore
straightforwardly defined. Considering the inverse problem, we note that the
past bids may contain both congested and uncongested instances. The set of
marginal suppliers may be different in each instance, and furthermore the islands
in the congested instances may be different. But in either case, our approach can
handle these different sets, since for each observation j, we can have different
price islands s ∈ Sj , where Sj is the set of price islands for the j-th observation,
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and for each price island of that observation we have a set of marginal suppliers
denoted by Ijs . Hence, the inverse optimization problem in (9) is applied for
each price island s for observations j within this island, and for the respective set
of marginal suppliers for the specific island. Essentially, the uncongested case
represents one single island (and can still be described by the above notation).
8 Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper, we proposed an inverse optimization method to estimate elec-
tricity suppliers’ cost functions in the day-ahead electricity market based on
historical bidding data. The problem of computing optimal bidding strategies
can be seen as an equilibrium computation problem given the estimated pay-
off functions. We applied a “random search” algorithm to estimate the cost
function parameters of electricity generators; specifically, the parameters that
are proportional to their generation output. The algorithm essentially seeks
cost function parameters (among multiple possible values compatible with the
past data) which have good out-of-sample generalization performance. We es-
tablished strong, exponential-type probabilistic convergence guarantees for this
algorithm. Extensive numerical experimentation verifies that one can recover
accurate estimates of the cost function parameters, which, in turn, allows gen-
erators to bid with knowledge of how competitors would respond. Even though
we considered a simple setting involving no congestion or transmission network
effects, we discussed an extension of the methodology to location-dependent
prices.
Regarding future research directions, it would be of interest to develop non-
parametric approaches that do not require to assume a specific parametric form
for the cost functions. Finally, in addition to estimating competing generators’
cost functions, our methodology is particularly useful in estimating the underly-
ing cost functions of market participants who bid synthetic or virtual generators
corresponding to contracts with either physical generation owners or a portfolio
of demand-response-capable consumers.
References
[1] F. C. Schweppe, M. C. Caramanis, R. D. Tabors, and R. E. Bohn, Spot
pricing of electricity. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
[2] A. K. David and F. Wen, “Strategic bidding in competitive electricity mar-
kets: a literature survey,” in Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting,
2000. IEEE, vol. 4. IEEE, 2000, pp. 2168–2173.
[3] G. Li, J. Shi, and X. Qu, “Modeling methods for GenCo bidding strategy
optimization in the liberalized electricity spot market–a state-of-the-art
review,” Energy, vol. 36, no. 8, pp. 4686–4700, 2011.
25
[4] (2016) Euphemia public description. PCR market coupling algorithm. [On-
line]. Available: http://www.nordpoolspot.com
[5] P. D. Klemperer and M. A. Meyer, “Supply function equilibria in oligopoly
under uncertainty,” Econometrica, vol. 57, pp. 1243–1277, 1989.
[6] R. J. Green and D. M. Newbery, “Competition in the British electricity
spot market,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100, no. 5, pp. 929–953,
1992.
[7] P. Holmberg and D. M. Newbery, “The supply function equilibrium and
its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions,” Utilities Policy,
vol. 18, pp. 209–226, 2010.
[8] E. J. Anderson and A. B. Philpott, “Using supply functions for offering
generation into an electricity market,” Operations Research, vol. 50, no. 3,
pp. 477–489, 2002.
[9] E. J. Anderson and X. Hu, “Finding supply function equilibria with asym-
metric firms,” Operations Research, vol. 56, no. 53, pp. 697–711, 2008.
[10] P. Holmberg, “Numerical calculation of an asymmetric supply function
equilibrium with capacity constraints,” European Journal of Operational
Research, vol. 199, no. 1, pp. 285–295, 2009.
[11] R. Sioshansi and S. Oren, “How good are supply function equilibrium mod-
els: an empirical analysis of the ERCOT balancing market,” Journal of
Regulatory Economics, vol. 31, pp. 1–35, 2007.
[12] A. David, “Competitive bidding in electricity supply,” in IEE Proceedings
C (Generation, Transmission and Distribution), vol. 140, no. 5. IET, 1993,
pp. 421–426.
[13] F. Wen and A. David, “Strategic bidding for electricity supply in a day-
ahead energy market,” Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 59, no. 3, pp.
197–206, 2001.
[14] T. Li and M. Shahidehpour, “Strategic bidding of transmission-constrained
GENCOs with incomplete information,” IEEE Transactions on Power Sys-
tems, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 437–447, 2005.
[15] A. D. Yucekaya, J. Valenzuela, and G. Dozier, “Strategic bidding in elec-
tricity markets using particle swarm optimization,” Electric Power Systems
Research, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 335–345, 2009.
[16] A. Cherukuri and J. Corte´s, “Decentralized Nash equilibrium learning by
strategic generators for economic dispatch,” in American Control Confer-
ence (ACC), 2016. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1082–1087.
[17] L. Mitridati and P. Pinson, “A Bayesian inference approach to unveil supply
curves in electricity markets,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2017.
26
[18] M. Motalleb and G. R, “Non-cooperative game-theoretic model of demand
response aggregator competition for selling stored energy in storage de-
vices,” Applied Energy, vol. 202, pp. 581–596, 2017.
[19] P. Zou, Q. Chen, Q. Xia, G. He, C. Kang, and A. J. Conejo, “Pool equilibria
including strategic storage,” Applied Energy, vol. 177, pp. 260–270, 2016.
[20] D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, and I. C. Paschalidis, “Data-driven estimation in
equilibrium using inverse optimization,” Mathematical Programming, vol.
153, no. 2, pp. 595–633, 2015.
[21] R. Ahuja and J. Orlin, “Inverse optimization,” Operations Research, vol. 49,
no. 5, pp. 771–783, 2001.
[22] D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, and I. C. Paschalidis, “Inverse optimization:
A new perspective on the black-litterman model,” Operations Research,
vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 1389–1403, 2013.
[23] Q. Zhao, A. Stettner, E. Reznik, I. C. Paschalidis, and D. Segre´, “Mapping
the landscape of metabolic goals of a cell,” Genome Biology, vol. 17, no. 1,
p. 109, 2016.
[24] C. Ruiz, A. J. Conejo, and D. J. Bertsimas, “Revealing rival marginal offer
prices via inverse optimization,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 3056–3064, 2013.
[25] J. Saez-Gallego, J. M. Morales, M. Zugno, and H. Madsen, “A data-driven
bidding model for a cluster of price-responsive consumers of electricity,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 5001–5011, 2016.
[26] J. R. Birge, A. Hortac¸su, and J. M. Pavlin, “Inverse optimization for the
recovery of market structure from market outcomes: An application to the
MISO electricity market,” Operations Research, vol. 65, no. 34, pp. 837–
855, 2017.
[27] T. Lu, Z. Wang, J. Wang, Q. Ai, and C. Wang, “A data-driven Stackelberg
market strategy for demand response-enabled distribution sytems,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, 2018.
[28] R. Chen, M. Caramanis, and I. C. Paschalidis, “Strategic equilibrium bid-
ding for electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market using inverse optimiza-
tion,” in Proceedings of the 56th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,
Melbourne, Australia, December 12–16 2017.
[29] X. Hu and D. Ralph, “Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured
electricity markets with locational prices,” Operations Research, vol. 55,
no. 5, pp. 809–827, 2007.
[30] B. F. Hobbs, C. B. Metzler, and J.-S. Pang, “Strategic gaming analysis
for electric power systems: An MPEC approach,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 638–645, 2000.
27
Proof of Thm. 5.1
Proof. Assume that the optimal solutions to the inverse problem at iteration k
are θˆ
k
1 , . . . , θˆ
k
N , and the optimal value is zk. We will first show that the function
fk(α) ,
(−∇1φ1(θˆk1 ;α, Q, ξ), . . . ,−∇NφN (θˆkN ;α, Q, ξ)) is strongly monotone.
For simplicity we suppress the dependence of f on θi, Q and ξ. By definition, a
function fk(α) is strongly monotone if ∃γ > 0 such that
(
fk(α1)− fk(α2)
)′
(α1 −α2) ≥ γ‖α1 −α2‖22, ∀α1,α2.
Plugging in the formula for ∇iφi(θi;α, Q, ξ), we have:
fk(α1)− fk(α2) = (1− βˆ21
β1
(α1,1 − α2,1), . . . , 1− βˆ
2
N
βN
(α1,N − α2,N )
)
,
where α1,i, α2,i are the i-th elements of α1 and α2, respectively. Using (1 −
βˆ2i )/βi ≥ γ, ∀i, it follows
(
fk(α1)− fk(α2)
)′
(α1 −α2) ≥ γ‖α1 −α2‖22.
With the strongly monotone function fk(α), we can use [20, Thm. 8], which
shows that for any 0 < δ < 1, with probability at least 1− η with respect to the
sampling,
‖αjval − αˆjval‖2 ≤
√
zk/γ, ∀j = 1, . . . ,Mv,
where zk is the optimal value of the inverse optimization problem (9) at iteration
k. Using the norm inequality
‖αjval − αˆjval‖1 ≤
√
N‖αjval − αˆjval‖2,
we obtain that at iteration k, the discrepancy satisfies:
d ≤
√
zk/(Nγ) ≤
√
ǫ¯/(Nγ),
which yields that
P(d ≤
√
ǫ¯/(Nγ)) ≥ 1− η. (13)
Since the iterations are independent from each other, setting p , P(d ≤
√
ǫ¯/(Nγ)),
and using (13), we have:
P
(
Algorithm terminates after T iterations
)
= (1 − p)T ≤ ηT .
Therefore, for any small 0 < ǫ < 1, if the probability that the algorithm termi-
nates after T iterations is below ǫ, we need T ≥ (log ǫ)/(log η).
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We next show that as the training sample size Mt increases, the number of
iterations that are needed decreases for a large enough Mt. First note that
η =
2N∑
i=0
(
Mt
i
)
δi(1− δ)Mt−i
=
2N∑
i=0
(Mt − i+ 1) . . .Mt
i!
δi(1− δ)Mt−i
≤
2N∑
i=0
(Mt)
i
i!
δi(1− δ)Mt−i.
Define hi(Mt) ,
(Mt)
i
i! δ
i(1− δ)Mt−i, and take its derivative:
∇hi(Mt) = (Mt)
i−1
(i − 1)! δ
i(1− δ)Mt−i
(
1 +
Mt
i
log(1− δ)
)
.
We see that for a large enough Mt, ∇hi(Mt) < 0, ∀i, since log(1 − δ) < 0.
Therefore, as Mt increases, η decreases, and the number of iterations, i.e.,
(log ǫ)/(log η), decreases as well.
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